

REMARKS

Formal drawings were submitted on September 24, 2002 and received by the USPTO on September 30, 2002.

Applicant gratefully acknowledges and thanks the Examiner for the allowance of claims 14-21.

Claims 1-3, 5-10 and 12 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as being anticipated by *Kroening et al.* (U.S. Patent 6,080,207).

Applicants traverse this rejection on the grounds that this reference is defective in supporting a rejection under 35 U.S.C. §102.

Independent claim 1 includes: A method of manufacturing a computing product comprising:

placing an assembled computing product in a shipping container to provide a containerized computing product;

transmitting configuration information to the assembled computing product via a wireless communication connection;

receiving the configuration information by the assembled computing product; and

configuring the containerized computing product with the received configuration information, via the wireless configuration information.

The PTO provides in MPEP §2131..."To anticipate a claim, the reference must teach every element of the claim...". Therefore, to sustain this rejection *Kroening et al.* must contain all of the claimed elements of independent claim 1. However, the

Kroening et al. patent does not include the claimed combination. Therefore, the rejection is unsupported by the art and should be withdrawn.

“A claim is anticipated only if each and every element as set forth in the claim is found, either expressly or inherently described in a single prior art reference.” *Verdegaal Bros. V. Union Oil Co. Of California*, 814 F.2d 628, 631, 2 USPQ2d 1051, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987).” “The identical invention must be shown in as complete detail as contained in the ...claim.” *Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.*, 868 F.2d 1226, 1236, 9 USPQ2d 1913, 1920 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

Therefore, independent claim 1 and the respective dependent claims are not anticipated by the prior art reference.

Claims 4, 11 and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as being unpatentable over *Kroening et al.*.

Applicants traverse this rejection on the grounds that the reference is defective in establishing a *prima facie* case of obviousness.

As the PTO recognizes in MPEP § 2142:

...The examiner bears the initial burden of factually supporting any *prima facie* conclusion of obviousness. If the examiner does not produce a *prima facie* case, the applicant is under no obligation to submit evidence of nonobviousness...

In the present case, the reference fails to teach the invention defined by claim 1 and the respective dependent claims. Thus, the rejection is improper because, when evaluating a claim for determining obviousness, all limitations of the claim must be evaluated. In this context, 35 USC §103 provides that:

A patent may be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the *subject matter* as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was

made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains ... (Emphasis added)

Because all the limitations of claim 1 have not been met by the cited reference, it is impossible to render the subject matter as a whole obvious. Thus the explicit terms of the statute have not been met and the examiner has not borne the initial burden of factually supporting any *prima facie* conclusion of obviousness.

The Federal Circuit has held that a reference did not render the claimed combination *prima facie* obvious in *In re Fine*, 873 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988), because *inter alia*, the examiner ignored a material, claimed, temperature limitation which was absent from the reference. In variant form, the Federal Circuit held in *In re Evanega*, 829 F.2d 1110, 4 USPQ2d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 1987), that there was want of *prima facie* obviousness in that:

The mere absence [from the reference] of an explicit requirement [of the claim] cannot reasonably be construed as an affirmative statement that [the requirement is in the reference].

In *Jones v. Hardy*, 727 F.2d 1524, 220 USPQ 1021 (Fed. Cir 1984), the Federal Circuit reversed a district court holding of invalidity of patents and held that:

The "difference" may have seemed slight (as has often been the case with some of history's great inventions, e.g., the telephone) but it may also have been the key to success and advancement in the art resulting from the invention. Further, it is irrelevant in determining obviousness that all or all other aspects of the claim may have been well known in the art.

The Federal Circuit has also continually cautioned against myopic focus on the obviousness of the difference between the claimed invention and the prior art rather than on the obviousness of the claimed invention as a whole relative to the prior art as §103 requires. See, e.g., *Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.* 802 F.2d 1367, 1383, 231 USPQ 81, 93 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Therefore, independent claim 1 and the claims dependent therefrom are submitted to be allowable.

In view of the above, it is respectfully submitted that remaining claims 1-13 are in condition for allowance. Accordingly, an early Notice of Allowance for all claims 1-21 is courteously solicited.


Respectfully submitted,



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